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The Case Against Entrenchment
of a Canadian Bill of Rights Douglas A. Schmeiser*
I. Introduction
A limited form of judicial review has always been a prominent
feature of Canadian federalism. Immediately after confedera-
tion, Canadian Courts assumed the jurisdiction to declare a
statute to be beyond the legislative competence of the enacting
body.' Until comparatively recently, Courts have also assumed
that a totality of unrestricted legislative power resides in
Parliament and the Provincial legislatures, i.e., as long as
legislative jurisdiction exists, there is no limitation on the nature
of legislation which may be passed. As far back as 1887, the
Privy Council, in Bank of Toronto v. Lambe,2 described the
B.N.A. Act3 as follows:
Their Lordships have to construe the express words
of an Act of Parliament which makes an elaborate
distribution of the whole field of legislative authority
between two legislative bodies, and at the same time
provides for the federated provinces a carefully
balanced constitution, under which no one of the
parts can pass laws for itself except under the control
of the whole acting through the Governor-General.
And the question they have to answer is whether the
one body or the other has power to make a given law.
If they find that on the due construction of the Act a
legislative power falls within sect. 92, it would be
quite wrong of them to deny its existence because by
some possibility it may be abused, or may limit the
range which otherwise would be open to the
Dominion parliament.
*Professor of Law, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon.
1. See B.L. Strayer, Judicial Review of Legislation in Canada, U. of
Tor. Press, 1968, pp. 19-22.
2. [18871 12 A.C. 575.
3. Imp., 30 Vict., c. 3 (1867).
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And they adhere to the view which has always been
taken by this Committee, that the Federation Act
exhausts the whole range of legislative power, and
that whatever is not thereby given to the provincial
legislatures rests with the parliament.4
This view was reiterated by the Privy Council in A.G. Ont. v.
A. G. Canada: 
5
Again, if the text says nothing expressly then it is not
to be presumed that the Constitution withholds the
power altogether. On the contrary, it is to be taken
for granted that the power is bestowed in some
quarter unless it be extraneous to the statute itself
(as, for example, a power to make laws for some part
of His Majesty's dominions outside of Canada) or
otherwise is clearly repugnant to its sense. For
whatever belongs to self-government in Canada belongs
either to the Dominion or to the provinces, within
the limits of the British North America Act. It
certainly would not be sufficient to say that the
exercise of a power might be oppressive, because that
result might ensue from the abuse of a great number
of powers indispensable to self-government, and
obviously bestowed by the British North America
Act. Indeed it might ensue from the breach of almost
any power.
6
This doctrine of the totality of legislative power is a natural
federal adaptation of the English doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy, described by Holt C.J. many years ago in the
following terms: "An act of Parliament can do no wrong,
though it may do Several things that look pretty odd." 7
Beginning with the Alberta Press case,' individual Judges
occasionally have made references to implied limitations of
legislative power inherent in the B.N.A. Act. In that case, Duff
C.J., by way of obiter, denied the right of a Province to
4. 12 A.C. 575, at pp. 587, 588.
5. [1912] A.C. 622.
6. Ibid., pp. 634-5.
7. City of London v. Wood (1701) 12 Mod. 669, at pp. 687-8.
8. [19381 S.C.R. 100, (1938) 2 D.L.R. 81.
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"interfere with the working of the parliamentary institutions of
Canada". 9 He stated that Parliament had authority "to legislate
for the protection" of public discussion,1 but did not state
whether Parliament could take away this right. In Saumur v.
City of Quebec and A.G. Quebec,' ' Rand, Kellock and Estey
JJ., in holding that provincial legislatures did not have
jurisdiction over religious freedom, suggested that section 93 of
the B.N.A. Act, protecting denominational education, implicitly
protected religious freedom. In Murpby v. C.P.R.,1 Rand J.
restated the totality doctrine as follows: It has become a truism
that the totality of effective legislative power is conferred by
the Act of 1867, subject always to the express or necessarily
implied limitations of the Act itself.' 3 There has been only one
suggestion in the Supreme Court of Canada that constitution-
ally implied limitations of legislative power apply to Parliament
as well as to the provincial legislatures. In Switzman v. Elbling
and A.G. Quebec, 1 4 Abbott J., after holding that the Province
of Quebec did not have the power to pass the Communistic
Propaganda Act, stated:
Although it is not necessary, of course, to determine
this question for the purpose of the present appeal,
the Canadian Constitution being declared to be
similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom, I
am also of opinion that as our constitutional Act now
stands, Parliament itself could not abrogate this right
of discussion and debate. The power of Parliament to
limit it is, in my view, restricted to such powers as
may be exercisable under its exclusive legislative
jurisdiction with respect to criminal law and to make
laws for the peace, order and good Government of
the nation.' '
This is the sole assertion that Parliament might be prevented
from legislating on a matter within its legislative competence
9. [19381 S.C.R. 100, at p. 134.
10. Ibid., p. 133.
11. [19531 2 S.C.R. 299, (1953) 4 D.L.R. 641.
12. [19581 S.C.R. 626, 15 D.L.R. (2d) 145.
13. 119581 S.C.R. 626, at p. 643.
14. [1957] S.C.R. 285, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 337.
15. [1957] S.C.R. 285, at p. 328.
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because of a basic right implied; in the constitution. In summary,
the implied limitation theory has never been the basis of any
constitutional decision, and can muster only occasional dicta in
its support.
Proposals to entrench a Canadian Bill of Rights constitute
a radical departure from our traditional constitutional practice.
Entrenchment means that Parliament and the provincial
legislatures no longer would be supreme in their respective
spheres. In addition to determining what those respective
spheres are, courts would have the power to declare legislation
unconstitutional on the ground that in their view the legislation
offended certain constitutional protections. In such instances,
the courts would be imposing their will, often on policy
matters, over that of Parliament or the legislatures, and the
latter bodies would have no choice but to obey, barring a
constitutional amendment.
At first glance, entrenchment of fundamental rights
appears to be a forward step. What can be wrong, it may be
asked, with setting out in our constitution those principles and
techniques which we consider necessary for a free and
democratic society? Arguably, entrenchment would protect the
people against oppressive and ill-conceived action on the part of
government, federal as well as provincial, and this seems
desirable.
When the matter is examined more closely, however, many
difficulties in this extended use of judicial review become
apparent, and these difficulties will be examined below. If we
entrench a Bill of Rights, we are, in effect, adopting the
American practice of judicial review. Thus an evaluation of the
American experience under its Bill of Rights will assist us in
understanding the implications of entrenchment in Canada. It is
suggested that even a cursory glance at the American scene
indicates that entrenchment is not a panacea to problems of
human rights. Rather, it is suggested that an examination of
American material indicates that entrenchment and the con-
sequent practice of judicial review have not only failed to solve,
but have contributed to, some current American social
problems, and further indicates that entrenchment of funda-
mental rights in Canada might be harmful to Canadian public
life.
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At the present time many Canadians have a favourable
view of an entrenched Bill of Rights because the American
Supreme Court in recent times has used the American Bill to
improve the plight of the American Negro. These Canadians
tend to forget that until 1954 the American Supreme Court
took the opposite view on segregation, and that racial problems
are still acute. They tend to forget that much of the progress
made in solving the problems of Negro rights has been the result
not of decisions of the Supreme Court, but of civil rights
legislation enacted by Congress since 1957. They tend to forget
that only a very few cases come before the Supreme Court, and
that, in any event, many of the decisions of the lower courts as
well as some of the Supreme Court itself are totally
unacceptable to Canadian society.
IL Summary of Difficulties Involved in Entrenchment
1. Political Nature of Judicial Decisions
The most basic difficulty with the operation of judicial review
of laws concerning fundamental rights is that general constitu-
tional phrases are words of uncertain and varying content.
Interpretations of such phrases are inherently political de-
cisions, not typically legal decisions, and Judges are not as
competent as legislators to make them. Basic policy decisions
should be made by legislatures because of their superior powers
with respect to fact-finding, awareness of public needs and
opinion, formulation of national goals, compromise, timing, and
economic resources. The adversary system of judicial proceed-
ings, limited to the facts of a particular case and restricted by
rules of evidence and procedure, is ill-equipped to deal with
complex social problems. There is no historical or democratic
warrant for Judges to act as super-legislators or philosopher
kings. The problem is aptly stated by Professor Henry Steele
Commager:
The real question, of course, is not that of blind or
malicious majorities striking down constitutional
barriers, but of differing interpretations of the
meaning of the constitution. The crucial question is
not so much whether an act does or does not
conform to the constitution (for everyone agrees that
it should), but who shall judge as to conformity?...
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Judicial review leads inevitably to judicial legisla-
tion...
Indeed, if we turn - for simplicity - to the federal
scene, we will find that acts which have encountered
judicial invalidation have in every instance required
the interpretation of vague and ambiguous clauses of
the constitution - clauses whose meaning is not to be
determined by legal research but by "consideration of
policy."1,6
Charles Grove Haines in an extensive study of judicial review
came to a similar conclusion:
Though it is not unusual for judges to differ in the
interpretation and application of legal terms and
principles the persistence of dissents in the cases
arising under the "due process" and "equal protec-
tion" phrases of the Fourteenth Amendment and
under the commerce clause indicates that, as Pre-
sident Roosevelt insisted, the judges are acting in a
quasi-legislative capacity. The determination of eco-
nomic and social policies whether by judges or
legislators is certain to bring differences of opinion
and to result in frequent reversals or modification of
former judgments. Persistent dissents during the past
few decades bear witness to the fact that judges in the
exercise of their broad powers through the applica-
tion of the doctrine of judicial supremacy are acting
to a limited extent, as Justice Brandeis suggests, in
the role of super-legislators.17
The political nature of judicial review has bothered some of the
most renowned Judges in American history, including Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Learned Hand, and Felix Frankfurter. This
concern has expressed itself in an attitude of judicial restraint as
16. "Judicial Review and Democracy", (1943) 19 Virginia Quarterly
Review 417, quoted in Leonard W. Levy, Judicial Review and the Supreme
Court, 1967, p. 64, at pp. 66-7.
17. The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy, 2nd ed., 1959, pp.
448-9.
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contrasted with one of judicial activism. Edward McWhinney
has referred to the approach of Judge Frankfurter as follows:
The main doctrinal justification of judicial self-
restraint at the present day proceed from judicial
acknowledgement of major limitations to the effec-
tiveness of the Court's assuming any activist role.
First is a limitation of expertise, stemming from
judicial awareness that judicial review is not always a
very efficient form of.policy-making; judges, because
of the highly specialized and concentrated education
in law and the training in professional practice that
they have undergone, are in this view manifestly not
the best equipped persons for translating community
values into constitutional policies, and the concept of
judicial notice, anyway it is said, is hardly an
adequate tool for the fact-finding necessary to an
informed policy choice." S
la. Decisions Based on Purely Personal Values
Since most of the decisions involving fundamental rights
disputes involve policy choices, Judges exercising a power of
judicial review are imposing their personal values and biases on
the legislatures, often frustrating the will of the people
expressed through their elected representatives. Many of the
American decisions declaring unconstitutional the social welfare
and humanitarian legislation of modern society can only be
explained on the basis of the prejudices and lack of
understanding of conservative-minded and establishment-
oriented Judges. In the words of President Theodore Roosevelt,
"The decisions of the Courts on economic and social questions
depend upon their economic and social philosophy."' 9 There is
no reason to assume that this phenomenon does not continue to
exist today.
A graphic illustration of judicial bias is the case of Locbner
v. New York, 2 0 where the Supreme Court of the United States
invalidated a statute restricting hours of work in a bakery to
18. Judicial Review, 4th ed., U. of Tor., 1969, p. 180.
19. Message to Congress, Dec. 8th, 1908.
20. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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sixty hours a week or an average of ten hours a day. Peckham
J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, stated:
The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a
health law, but is an illegal interference with the
rights of individuals, both employers and employees,
to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as
they may think best, or which they may agree upon
with the other parties to such contracts. Statutes of
the nature of that under review, limiting the hours in
which grown and intelligent men may labor to earn
their living, are mere meddlesome interferences with
the rights of the individual.' '
Holmes J. in dissent put the matter in a much different
perspective:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which
a large part of the country does not entertain. If it
were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I
should desire to study it further and long before
making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be
my duty, because I strongly believe that my
agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the
right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.
It is settled by various decisions of this court that
state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in
many ways which we as legislators might think as
injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this, and
which equally with this interfer with the liberty to
contract.... The Fourteenth Amendment does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics ... Some
of these laws embody convictions or prejudices which
judges are likely to share. Some may not. But a
constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the
organic relation of the citizen to the State or of
laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally
differing views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and
21. Ibid., p. 61.
The Case Against Entrenchment of a Canadian Bill of Rights 23
even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment
upon the question whether statutes embodying them
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
General propositions do not decide concrete
cases. The decisions will depend on a judgment of
intuition more subtle than any articulate major
premise. But I think that the proposition just stated,
if it is accepted, will carry us far toward the end.
Every opinion tends to become a law. I think that the
word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural
outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said
that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit
that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law. It does not need
research to show that no such sweeping condemna-
tion can be passed upon the statute before us. A
reasonable man might think it a proper measure on
the score of health. 
2 2
The result of this similar cases was not reversed until 1937,2 3 So
that the Court effectively blocked social reform in this area for
a substantial period of time.
Legal writers have often commented on the lack of
objectivity of American Courts. Commager has stated:
The question of judicial objectively is too large to
examine here in any detail, but it may not be
irrelevant to observe that almost every leader of
American democracy - Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln,
Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt - has
charged the courts with bias, and that from members
of the Supreme Court itself have come accusations
that the court indulges in "judicial legislation,"
warnings that the "fear of socialism" has influenced
judicial action, protests against a "tortured construc-
tion" of the Constitution. And it is difficult to read
such opinions as those of Story in the Charles River
22. Ibid., pp. 75-6.
23. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrisb, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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Bridge Company case, Taney in the Dred Scott case,
Field in the Income Tax case, McReynolds in the gold
clause cases - to take only a few of the most
notorious - and to avoid the conclusion that judges
are sometimes swayed by considerations other than
those of constitutional logic.2"
Miller and Howell came to a similar conclusion in a study of
judicial neutrality:
Throughout the history of American constitutional
development may be found recurring evidence of the
fact that Supreme Court Justices have been motivated
by value preferences in reaching decisions. At no time
have they resorted to neutrality or impersonality of
principle in making choices between competing
alternatives.
2 I
lb. Bad Judicial Decisions
Since judicial review requires policy choices, and since Judges
are imposing their personal biases on the legislatures, one should
expect that Courts will be wrong more often than they are right
when they invalidate legislation. The American Supreme Court
cases until 1943 nullifying Congressional action have been
summarized by Commager, and it is remarkable that in almost
all instances the decisions subsequently were reversed. Com-
mager's assessment of the record of the Supreme Court is as
follows:
It reveals, on the contrary, that the Court has
effectively intervened, again and again, to defeat
Congressional attempts to free the slave, to guarantee
civil rights to Negroes, to protect workingmen, to
outlaw child labor, to assist hardpressed farmers, and
to democratize the tax system. From this analysis the
Congress, and not the courts, emerges as the
instrument for the realization of the guarantee of the
Bill of Rights.
24. Op. cit. fn. 16, p. 67.
25. "The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication", Arthur
S. Miller and Ronald F. Howell (1960), 27 U. of Chi. L.R. 661, quoted in
Levy, Judicial Review and the Supreme Court, at p. 213.
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What is perhaps most impressive about this
record is that it tends to support the Jeffersonian
allegation that the court is neither more learned nor
more objective than the political branches of the
government. Almost every instance of judicial nullifi-
cation of Congressional acts appears, now, to have
been a mistaken one. In many - perhaps in most -
instances the mistake has been (after a decent
interval) conceded and corrected by the Court itself.
In other instances it has been recified by the
operation of public opinion. The conclusion is almost
inescapable that judicial review has been a drag upon
democracy and - what we may conceive to be the
same thing - upon good government.
2 6
Since 1943, the American Supreme Court has been far more
active in the area of civil rights, and its judgments in some areas
have been of high quality. One does not require much of a sense
of history, however, to realize that many of the more current
decisions of the Court will subsequently be reversed, particul-
arly the ones dealing with freedom of expression, freedom of
religion, and criminal procedure. As a distinguished American
Judge has aptly stated: "Judges who have voted against the
constitutionality of national legislation have not usually been
vindicated by the passage of time." 2 7
2. Undemocratic Nature of Judicial Review
Judicial review is inherently an undemocratic procedure because
it gives Judges the power to substitute their personal opinions
for those of the electorate. The democratic issue can be stated
simply: should policy decisions be made by legislators who are
accountable to the people, or by Judges who are not so
accountable? Should five men on the Supreme Court of Canada
have the right to overrule the wishes of the elected representa-
tives of the people?
Until now, Canada has operated under principles of
responsible government and the sovereignty of the people. As
Rand J. described our system:
26. Op. cit. fn. 16, pp. 72-3.
27. Whereas - A Judge's Premises, Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., 1965,
Little, Brown and Co., p. 160.
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Whatever the deficiencies in its workings, Canadian
government is in substance the will of the majority
expressed directly or indirectly through popular
assemblies. This means ultimately government by the
free public opinion of an open society, the effective-
ness of which, as events have not infrequently
demonstrated, is undoubted.2 8
Judicial review subjects the operation of self-government to the
opinion of the Courts - in fact the system was instituted to
avoid the dangers of capricious majorities. Unfortunately, the
system does not avoid the dangers of capricious Courts. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter has pointed out:
In his First Inaugural Jefferson spoke of the "sacred
principle" that "the will of the majority is in all cases
to prevail." Jefferson himself hardly meant all by
"all." . . . In any event, one need not give full
adherence to his view to be deeply mindful of the
fact that judicial review is a deliberate check upon
democracy through an organ of government not
subject to popular control.
2 9
McWhinney has noted an unfortunate, but inevitable, by-
product of this system:
The situation tends to arise inevitably, then, as indeed
was the case up to the Court Revolution of 1937,
that those who are no longer able to control the
legislature look to the courts to preserve their special
interests.
3 0
If Canadian democracy had been a failure, and if legislative
majorities had been arbitrarily and capriciously oppressing
minority groups, then there would be some justification for
compromising our democracy in favour of a broader judicial
review power. It is submitted, however, that this has not been
the case, and that the Canadian people should not relinquish
28. Switzman v. Elbling and A.G. Quebec [1957] S.C.R. 285, at p.
306.
29. "John Marshall and the Judicial Function", quoted in John
Marshall, Kurland Series ed., Phoenix Books, 1967, 135 at p. 155.
30. Op. cit. fn. 18, p. 182.
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part of their sovereignty to the potential despotism of the
Judiciary.
2a. Shifting of Responsibility and Destruction of Popular
Responsibility
Where final responsibility for political decisions is taken from
the elected representatives of the people and is given to the
Courts, an erosion of democratic responsibility tends to
develop. Final responsibility is a sobering obligation; a politician
will be very careful before supporting legislation which allegedly
violates fundamental rights. If, however, the politician knows
that a Court will review the propriety of his legislation, he will
be more careless about his legislative product, and may rely on
the Courts to correct his errors. Thus he can avoid responsibility
for difficult decisions, passing off that responsibility to the
Courts, and hiding his own preferences by ostensible concern
about the constitutionality of legislation rather than its
propriety. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has pungently criticized this
tendency:
• .. But neither can the liberal spirit be enforced by
judicial invalidation of illiberal legislation. Our con-
stant preoccupation with the constitutionality of
legislation rather than with its wisdom tends to
preoccupation of the American mind with a false
value. The tendency of focussing attention on
constitutionality is to make constitutionality synony-
mous with wisdom, to regard a law as all right if it is
constitutional. Such an attitude is a great enemy of
liberalism. Particularly in legislation affecting free-
dom of thought and freedom of speech much which
should offend a free-spirited society is constitutional.
Reliance for the most precious interests of civiliza-
tion, therefore, must be found outside of their
vindication in courts of law.
3 1
James Bradley Thayer came to the same conclusion:
The people of the States, when making new
constitutions, have long been adding more and more
31. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624, at pp.
670-1 (1943, dissenting).
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prohibitions and restraints upon their legislatures.
The courts, meantime, in many places, enter into the
harvest thus provided for them with a light heart, and
too promptly and easily proceed to set aside
legislative acts. The legislatures are growing ac-
customed to this distrust, and more and more readily
incline to justify it, and to shed the consideration of
constitutional restraints, - certainly as concerning
the exact extent of these restrictions, - turning that
subject over to the court; and, what is worse, they
insensibly fall into a habit of assuming that whatever
they can constitutionally do they may do - as if
honor and fair dealing and common honesty were not
relevant to their inquiries.
3 1
It is not unfair to suggest that some American politicians
have come to welcome the intervention of the Supreme Court
because the court can be the justification, or the whipping-boy,
for their own action or lack of action. If the courts uphold
legislation, this is twisted into an endorsement of its wisdom; if
the courts invalidate legislation, this is an ideal excuse for
subsequent inaction. A politician can champion a popular cause
which he knows to be unconstitutional, and he can refuse to
support good causes by expressing a belief in their unconstitu-
tionality.
These same tendencies will affect the electorate as well.
The people will find it difficult to assess the performance of
their representatives because of the constitutional arguments,
and because of the equation of constitutionality with rightness.
They can no longer assume responsibility for social changes,
because of a realization that their decisions are subject to
judicial review and because they will look to the Courts to
exercise an affirmative legislative function. Public issues no
longer will be resolved effectively by the usual political
processes because of the cumbersome and tortuous legal
channels which must be followed before effective action can
result. Good examples are the desegregation and poverty
programs in the United States. In the end result, the people can
no longer change policies and correct abuses by elective
32. John Marshall, op. cit. fn. 29, pp. 83-4.
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processes. Thus they have lost both the responsibilities and the
privileges of self-government.
2b. Undemocratic Nature of Judicial Appointments
Another manifestly undemocratic aspect of judicial review is
that the persons who wield the enormous power of review are
appointed by the executive, are not responsible to the people,
and are protected from removal by tenure.
The Canadian record in judicial appointments has not been
a complimentary one, for the main qualification has always
been political. If the jurisdiction of the Courts were extended to
fundamental policy issues, the tendency would be to examine
even more closely the political and social views of the
appointees. The uproar concerning Mr. Justice Fortas of the
United States Supreme Court, and the difficulties experienced
in the attempted appointment by President Nixon of Judge
Clement Haynsworth Jr. to the Supreme Court are instructive in
this regard. The fact that all appointments are made by the
federal government will also work to the disadvantage of the
Provinces, since the appointees will tend to be federally
oriented, and since certain provincial views will not be
represented on the Court.
Tenure presents another problem, since superior Court
Judges hold office during good behaviour until the age of
seventy-five years, and can be removed only in the event of
gross misconduct. Our society has not concerned itself with the
problem of the incompetent Judge or the Judge out of touch
with reality. It is a worrying prospect that five old men, a bare
majority on the Supreme Court, could rule on the great social
and political issues of the nation contrary to and regardless of
the wishes of the populace. A striking example of this occurred
in the early years of Franklin Roosevelt's administration during
the Great Depression. A substantial majority of the population
has voted for a "New Deal" to rescue themselves from the
Depression. The newly elected Congress passed numerous
statutes during the early years of its office, only to have them
declared unconstitutional by a Court that espoused the myths
of a by-gone era. Only when President Roosevelt threatened to
appoint Judges with more compatible social views to the court
was his legislative programme upheld.
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The key issue is whether Canada should also create a Court
which can thwart the public will. There certainly is no
democratic or pressing warrant for doing so.
2c. Learning Experience for People to Correct Own Mistakes
In the exercise of governmental functions, democratic major-
ities will on occasion make mistakes. In order for democracy to
flourish it is necessary for the people to correct their own
mistakes, and to profit by them. Democracy requires that
people continue to be concerned about their legislation even
after it is enacted. The effect of resolving fundamental rights
problems in the Courts rather than in the legislatures is to make
the people apathetic about democratic responsibilities, and to
deny them a great learning experience. Thayer has stated:
Great and, indeed, inestimable as are the advantages
in a popular government of this conservative in-
fluence, - the power of the judiciary to disregard
unconstitutional legislation, - it should be remem-
bered that the exercise of it, even when unavoidable,
is always attended with a serious evil, namely, that
the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the
outside, and the people thus lose the political
stimulus that comes from fighting the question out in
the ordinary war, and correcting their own errors...
(After referring to some American decisions where
the Courts had refused to intervene, he continued:)
But I venture to think that the good which came to
the country and its people from the vigorous thinking
that had to be done in the political debates that
followed, from the infiltration through every part of
the population of sound ideas and sentiments, from
the rousing into activity of opposite elements, the
enlargement of ideas, the strengthening of moral
fibre, and t growth of political experience that came
out of it all, - that all this far more than outweighed
any evil which ever flowed from the refusal of the
Court to interfere with the work of the legislature. 33
33. John Marshall, ibid., pp. 85-6.
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2d. The Importance of Symbols
People tend to respond to the expectations of others and to
their goals. In order to maintain a free society it is necessary to
foster among the people and among their representatives a sense
of responsibility for freedom. If the people appreciate that they
are the primary guardians of freedom, they will be conscious of,
and watchful for, violations of freedom. They also will be more
conscious of the caliber of the representatives which they elect.
If the people feel that final responsibility for preserving
freedom rests with the Courts, they will be less concerned about
their own role and with the performance of their representa-
tives. In the English tradition, Parliament has been regarded as
the champion of liberty, and it has responded amply to that
image. In the American tradition, the Courts are regarded as the
champions of liberty, with the result that insufficient care has
been given to the content of many enactments. Obviously both
the legislatures and the Courts can play an important role in the
maintenance of freedom, but it is better if representatives of the
people regard themselves as primarily responsible.
3. Loss of Independence and Prestige by Court
For a court system to operate effectively, litigants must believe
that the Judges are fair and impartial, and that they (the
litigants) will receive equal justice under the law. That feeling
vanishes when courts become involved in political controversies,
and Judges lose their mantle of integrity and independence.
This is painfully apparent in the American scene, where public
criticism of the courts is a common pastime, where for many
the phrase "the Warren Court" is a term of derision, and where
the present Chief Justice, W. E. Burger, was specifically chosen
to change the orientation of the Court. To again quote
Commager:
It may not be irrelevant to observe that almost every
leader of American democracy - Jefferson, Jackson,
Lincoln, Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin
Roosevelt - has charged the courts with bias. .. "
Once such prominent allegations of bias appear, particularly
34. Levy, Judicial Review and the Supreme Court, op. cit., p. 67.
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when they appear to be justified, the people begin to lose
confidence in the Courts, and their work is undermined.
McWhinney has also noted:
A [further] limitation may be labeled a limitation of
prestige. If the court essays an activist role it cannot
avoid taking sides in the political conflicts of the age.
The end product of this must be to embroil the Court
in undignified partisan controversy, and there may be
a risk too, as happened with the Old Court majority
before 1937, of the Court itself going down with a
lost political cause. "In times of political passion,
dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed
to legislative conduct and as readily believed. Courts
are not the place for such controversies."
3
The statute of individual Judges also suffers heavily with
judicial review. Since Judges are usually influenced in funda-
mental rights cases by their personality, character, predilections,
and experience, a liberal outlook will be reflected in liberal
judgments, and a conservative outlook will be reflected in
conservative judgments. A particular Judge need render only a
few decisions, and -he will be dubbed a "liberal" or a
"conservative", or, sometimes, a "radical" or a "reactionary".
As Haines has pointed out:
It is the failure to understand how five Judges can
agree that an act of Congress is unconstitutional
"beyond rational doubt," when four of their as-
sociates who have heard the same arguments declare
that the validity seems "absolutely free from doubt"
that has tended to weaken the respect for the
decisions to the Supreme Court on constitutional
issues. 3 6
Thus the impartiality of individual Judges will be suspect, and
undesirable pressures in judicial appointments will arise, if the
courts are involved in political controversies.
35. Judicial Review, op. cit. fn. 18, p. 182. The quotation is from Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, who gave the opinion of the Court in Tenney v.
Brandbove 341 U.S. 367, at p. 378 (1951).
36. The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy, op. cit. fn. 17, p.
449.
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3a. Strife Within Courts
When courts deal with controversial political matters, conflicts
and public disagreement develop within the court itself, leading
to a loss of public prestige. American Judges occasionally have
engaged in a form of backbiting and baiting of their dissenting
brethren, and Canada would do well without this development.
A humorous but pointed example is the dissenting judgment of
Roberts J. in Smith v. Allwright: 3 7
The reason for my concern is that the instant decision
overruling that announced about nine years ago,
tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the
same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this
day and train only. I have no assurance, in view of
current decisions, that the opinion announced today
may not shortly be repudiated and overruled by
justices who deem they have new light on the subject.
In the present term the Court has overruled three
cases.
3b. Judicial Errors
A legal system does not work well unless litigants believe that
courts will come to proper and just decisions. At the very
minimum a court must be right, in the judgment of history,
more often than it is wrong. Yet even this minimal claim cannot
be made for the work of the American Supreme Court in the
Bill of Rights cases, for as Judge Wyzanski has pointed out,
"Most of the cases in which the judiciary has declared national
legislation invalid have been subsequently overturned by
constitutional amendment or by a reversal of judicial
decisions." 3 8 Obviously our courts also have made errors in the
exercise of their traditional role, but judicial review substanti-
ally increases the margin of error. When constant claims are
made of judicial errors, and when some of these claims are
supported by later decisions of the Courts themselves, judicial
prestige diminishes, and people become unwilling to accept the
37. 321 U.S. 649, at p. 669 (1944). For a general discussion of the
problems, see McWbinney, op. cit., p. 177.
38. Op. cit. fn. 27, p. 158.
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decisions of the Courts. Respect for law and order is thus
undermined.
4. Sacrosanct Nature of Enumerated Rigbts; Future Develop-
ment Prevented
Another problem with entrenchment is that the specific rights
listed assume a sacrosanct character, and as society changes
development and reform is blocked. For example, the property
provisions of the American Bill were an adoption of eighteenth
century economic liberalism, and were used by the Courts in
the twentieth century to block humanitarian welfare legislation.
The Second Amendment preserving the "the right of the people
to keep and bear arms" is an anachronism in a modern civilized
society, and is making effective gun control legislation difficult.
The Seventh Amendment preserving the right to a jury trial in
actions involving more than twenty dollars today blocks
procedural reforms in the federal Courts, and, despite over-
loaded court dockets, discourages experimentation in non-jury
techniques in the state Courts.
Even rights which are commonly accepted by today's
society may become the millstones of future society. The
Canadian Bill of Rights includes the right against self-incrimina-
tion. This right grew up as a reaction to improper practices by
the Court of Star Chamber when executive practices were much
more primitive than they are today and when legal remedies
were ineffective. Many "civilized" Continental countries do not
accept the existence of, or justification for, this "right",
contending that it unreasonably protects criminal elements. It
may be that our future society will take a similar view, and
may wish to make an accused person a compellable witness or
to draw inferences from his silence. It is suggested that a future
society should be entitled to fashion its own rules of criminal
procedure, and should not be restricted by the notions of the
past.
The sacrosanct nature of enumerated rights often exerts a
negative influence on newly-developing rights which are equally
valid and deserving of public support. The right of privacy, to a
decent standard of living, fair employment, free education,
hospitalization and medical care are more important than many
of the rights listed in the American Bill of Rights, but they are
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never given as much prominence or support because the
focal-point of all consideration of fundamental rights is the Bill
itself. As society develops, new and competing claims will
encroach on the listed rights, and courts will support the old
rather than the new, to the detriment of reform.
An enumerated Bill of Rights often leads to an exaggerated
emphasis on rights, and to an insufficient consideration of the
responsibilities required for rights to exist. If constant attention
is focussed on entrenched rights, the general public begins to
think of them in absolute terms. They assume that much of
their questionable conduct will be protected, irrespective of
time, place or other circumstance. In the United States the
claim of constitutional right has almost become a comedian's
theme, mirroring a public sentiment that the notion of
constitutional rights has gone too far. It is obvious that the
freedom of one person conflicts with the freedom of another,
and that even freedoms themselves conflict with each other.
This obvious truth, and the importance of responsibility, can be
lost in the emphasis on entrenchment.
4a. Judicial Sanctification
Once a Supreme Court supports the existence of a particular
right, or rejects the claim of a competing right, subsequent
change becomes difficult. The possibilities are judicial reversal
or constitutional amendment, and both require substantial time
and effort, resulting in a lag in social reform.
5. Silly and Frivolous Litigation
There is no doubt that constitutional entrenchment will benefit
the legal profession, because judicial review unduly fosters
litigation, much of which is frivolous as well as expensive. Every
statute affects someone's right to do something, and there can
never be an end to possible constitutional challenge of
important legislation. The rich man or zealot will always
challenge the validity of legislation affecting his essential
interests, and social reform is again impeded while these cases
work their way to the Supreme Court.
In the United States literally thousands of cases containing
frivolous allegations of constitutional invalidity have come
before the Courts, and in some instances the claims have been
upheld. Many examples can be found in any constitutional text
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or book on fundamental freedoms, and for present purposes
reference will be made to a few instances. In Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,3 9 the Sup-
reme Court recently upheld the right of school-children to wear
black armbands to school as a form of protest against the Viet
Nam War. It is submitted that this decision is unfortunate from
a number of points of view. For one thing, public authorities
should be able to regulate the conduct of children in school,
and should not be required to cater to the whims of children.
For another, the Supreme Court should have more important
matters to deal with than such problems.
Another example of the trivial litigation which ensues
under entrenchment is Protestants and Other Americans United
for Separation of Church and State v. O'Brien.4 0 In that case, it
was held that the Postmaster General would not be acting
unconstitutionally in issuing a stamp bearing a picture of the
Madonna. A Court recently also dealt with the constitutionality
of a school recitation of a pledge of allegiance which contained
the "offensive" words "under God". 4
One means of illustrating the nature and extent of the
litigation that will result from constitutional entrenchment is to
enumerate legislative provisions that will be attacked in Canada
after entrenchment because of their alleged violation of
fundamental human rights, or have already been attacked under
the Canadian Bill of Rights. The following are obvious targets:
a. the Canadian Bill of Rights,42 which refers to "the
supremacy of God", and "spiritual values", allegedly
infringing the religious rights of those who do not
believe;
b. the Lord's Day Act,4 3  as violating religious
freedom;
39. 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969).
40. 272 F. Supp. 712 (D.C. D.C., 1967).
41. Smith v. Denny 280 F. Supp. 651 (D.C. Cal., 1968).
42. St. Can. 1960, c. 44, now found in R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II1.
43. R.S.C. 1970, c. L-13. Despite the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Robertson and Rosetanni v. (1963) S.C.R. 651, 41 D.L.R. (2d)
485, upholding the Lord's Day Act, Riley J. of the Alberta Supreme Court
held in Boardwalk Merchandise Mart Ltd. v. R. (1972) 6 W.W.R. 1 that the
Lord's Day Act was unconstitutional, but this has now been reversed by
the Alberta Court of Appeals: (1973) 1 W.W.R. 190.
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c. the Juvenile Delinquents Act,4 4 as violating the
right to a fair trial, and of due process;
d. the Indian Act,4" as violating freedom of pro-
perty, equality before the law, and due process;
e. the capital punishment sections of the Criminal
Code, as constituting cruel and unusual punishment
and violating due process; 
4 6
f. practically all substantive offences described in the
Criminal Code as being unconstitutionally vague and
a violation of due process;
4 7
g. reverse onus clauses, as violating the presumption
of innocence;4 8
h. the offence of blasphemous libel, as violating
freedom of religion;
i. the offences of treason, sedition, obscenity, spread-
ing false news, and defamatory libel, as violating
freedom of speech, assembly and association, and of
the press;
j. the criminal contempt power as violating freedom
of speech and of the press, and due process;
k. the prohibition of publication of evidence taken at
44. R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3. See also R. v. Gratton (1971) 17 C.R.N.S. 256
(N.B. C.A.).
45. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6. This is the effect of the judgment of the
Manitoba Court of Appeal in Canard v. A.G. Can. and Rees (1972) 5
W.W.R. 678, declaring inoperative section 43 of the Indian Act which gives
to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development jurisdiction
over testamentary matters of Indians. The classic decision is R. v.
Drybones (1970) S.C.R. 282, (1970) 3 C.C.C. 355, 10 C.R.N.S. 334, 71
W.W.R. 161, 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473 (S.C.C.), invalidating the special liquor
prohibitions contained in the Indian Act.
46. See sections 47, 75, 218, 669-681, Criminal Code. The American
constitutional position concerning capital punishment is discussed in
McGautha v. California, Crampton v. Ohio 402 U.S. 183, 28 L. Ed. 2d.
711, 91 S. Ct. 1454 (1971); Moore v. Illinois 92 S. Ct. 2562 (1972);
Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, Branch v. Texas 92 S. Ct. 2726
(1972).
47. See, for example, the decisions of the American Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade 93 S. Ct. 705, 755, 756, 762 (1973); Doe v. Bolton 93 S. Ct.
739, 755, 756, 762 (1973), invalidating state abortion provisions.
48. This contention was rejected in R. v. Appleby [1972] S.C.R. 303,
21 D.L.R. (3d) 325 (S.C.C.).
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a preliminary inquiry, as violating freedom of the
press;
1. the breathalyzer provisions of the Criminal Code
(ss. 235, 237) requiring breath samples and providing
that an inference adverse to an accused charged with
impaired driving may be drawn from his failure to
give a breath sample, as violating the right against
self-incrimination ;4 9
m. certain Criminal Code provisions which appear to
discriminate on the basis of sex; 0
n. public drunkenness statutes, as constituting cruel
and unusual punishment, or violating due process or
equal protection;' 1
o. the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence;
p. state aid to denominational schools, violating
religious freedom ;s 2
q. a denial of state aid to denominational schools, as
violating religious freedom;
r. the presence of denominational and affiliated
colleges at public universities, as violating religious
freedom;
s. all provisions in provincial educational statutes
dealing with religious instruction, prayers, language,
ceremonies, etc., as violating religious freedom;
49. The argument has finally been rejected by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Curr v. R. (1972) 26 D.L.R. (3d) 603, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 181, 18
C.R.N.S. 281, following numerous cases in lower Courts. See also Duke v.
R. (1972) 28 D.L.R. (3d) 129, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 474, 18 C.R.N.S. 302
(S.C.C.), holding that the failure of the police to provide the accused with
a sample of the breath taken from him was not a deprivation of a fair trial.
50. See, for example, sections 23 (accessories after the fact), 143-154
(sexual offences), 195 (procuring), 197 (providing necessaries), and the
now-repealed vagrancy provision concerning prostitutes (formerly section
175 (1) (c).
51. In Powell v. Texas 392 U.S. 514, 88 S. Ct. 2145, 20 L. Ed. (2d)
1254 (1967), the United States Supreme Court, by a five-four split, held
that conviction for public drunkenness of a chronic alcoholic did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment where it did not appear that the
accused was unable to stay off the streets on the occasion in question.
52. See fn. 76, infra.
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t. tax exemptions for church property or the clergy,
as violating religious freedom ;- 3
u. provincial censorship of movies, as violating
freedom of speech;
v. many rules of criminal procedure, as violating due
process;
5 4
w. all provincial statutes dealing with professional
societies, as violating equality before the law;
x. many prohibitory and procedural sections in
statutes such as the Income Tax Act, Immigration
Act, Opium and Narcotic Drug Act, Canada Evidence
Act, etc., as violating due process;
y. all expropriation legislation, federal or provincial,
as violating freedom of property and due process;
z. the effect of the denial of the right of, or the
absence of, counsel at various proceedings;
5 s
aa. compulsory school attendance laws as violating
religious freedom.1 6
The list is endless; these references are merely obvious examples
of the legal chaos that can arise or is already arising from the
notion of entrenched rights. Under entrenchment the final word
in all of these problems must come from the Courts.
This transfer of authority has many detrimental side-
effects. Legal certainty is always a difficult but desirable goal,
so that people will know what their rights and obligations are.
With the adoption of entrenchment, all legal rights will be more
unsettled, and the validity of new legislation will be doubtful
until ruled on by the Supreme Court. Governments launching
into new programs in sensitive areas will be unsure of legislative
53. See Walz v. New York Tax Commission 90 S. Ct. 1409 (1970),
rejecting this contention.
54. A good example is R. v. Smythe [1971] S.C.R. 690, 19 D.L.R.
(3d) 480 (S.C.C.) where an unsuccessful challenge was made to the
discretion of a prosecutor to proceed either by indictment or by summary
conviction.
55. Illustrative cases are R. v. Steeves [19631 42 C.R. 234, 42 D.L.R.
(2d) 335, [1964] 1 C.C.C. 266 (N.S. C.A.); R. v. Piper [19651 3 C.C.C.
135, 51 D.L.R. (2d) 534 (Man. C.A.);R. v. O'Connor [19661 S.C.R. 619,
57 D.L.R. (2d) 123 (S.C.C.); .. .; Brownridge v. R. (1972) 7 C.C.C. (2d)
417, 28 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 18 C.R.N.S. 308 (S.C.C.).
56. See Wisconsin v. Yoder 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972).
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validity for a number of years, and legislative momentum
inevitably will be lost. Although most of the legislative attacks
under the Canadian Bill of Rights have been unsuccessful, there
is no assurance that future Courts will not adopt different
approaches to these problems.
6. Litigation Syndrome
Another aspect of the increased litigation resulting from judicial
review deserves special comment. Judicial review has made
American society preoccupied with litigation, and the courts are
regarded as an integral part of the political process. Litigation is
viewed as a respectable, and in some instances the only
available, instrument of political reform. It is suggested,
however, that a legal system works best when it is invoked least,
and that increased litigation is not a desirable social activity.
A legislator should be concerned primarily with the
rightness of his legislation, not with its constitutionality, and
the people should have a similar concern. In a democracy,
decisions should be made through a process of reasoned debate,
co-operation, and compromise. The general legal goal should be
a system where individual conflict is minimized, and where
resort to the courts is reduced. Under judicial review the
barometer of legislative wisdom becomes its constitutionality,
and the legislator is distracted from his proper goal. Thayer has
written:
No doubt our doctrine of constitutional law has had a
tendency to drive out questions of justice and right,
and to fill the mind of legislators with thoughts of
mere legality, of what the constitution allows. And
moreover, even in the matter of legality, they have
felt little responsibility; if we are wrong, they say, the
courts will correct it. If what I have been saying is
true, the safe and permanent road towards reform is
that of impressing upon our people a far stronger
sense than they have of the great range of possible
harm and evil that our system leaves open, and must
leave open, to the legislatures, and of the clear limits
of judicial power; so that responsibility may be
brought sharply home where it belongs."
57. Judicial Review and the Supreme Court, op. cit. fn. 16, p. 63.
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Entrenchment enables a legislator on occasion to avoid the
moral implications of certain legislation. For example, Senator
Barry Goldwater, while a Presidential candidate, was able to
criticize the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the basis that it was
unconstitutional, thereby avoiding any public stand on the
merits of the Act.
Citizens may succumb to a similar preoccupation with
constitutionality, and choose an adversary proceeding to
enforce their views on others, regarding themselves as
champions of liberty in the process. Again, they may assume
that constitutionality is wisdom, that if their conduct is
constitutional it is good, and that if the conduct of others is
unconstitutional it is bad. Good citizens would better devote
their energy to the legislative process to ensure good laws, and
to so conduct themselves as to avoid conflict and litigation with
other persons. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has written:
No matter how often the Court insists that it is not
passing on policy when determing constitutionality,
the emphasis on constitutionality and its fascination
for the American public seriously confound problems
of constitutionality with the merits of a policy.
Industrial relations are not alone in presenting
problems that suffer in their solution from having
public opinion too readily assume that because some
measure is found to be constitutional it is wise and
right, and contrariwise, because it is found uncon-
stitutional it is intrinsically wrong. That such mis-
education of public opinion, with its effect upon
action, has been an important consequence of
committing to the Court the enforcement of "the
mood" represented by ... Vague constitutional
provisions, can hardly be gainsaid by any student of
their history.'
7. Judicial Review Destructive of the Federal Principles
The preamble to the B.N.A. Act refers to the desire of the
incorporating Provinces to be "federally united". This expresses
the continuing wish of the Provinces to be free to adopt
58. John Marshall, op. cit. fn. 29, pp. 162-3.
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different laws and procedures concerning the sensitive areas of
personal relationships found in section 92 of the Act. The
people of Canada have never wanted a governmental system
with identical laws in all parts of Canada; if they did, they
would press for the establishment of a unitary state. One of the
great advantages of the federal system is that people have the
right to differ, to experiment, to seek new ideas and solutions,
and to profit from the experiences of other Provinces. The
entire federal system thus becomes a working social laboratory,
resulting in benefit to all segments of society.
The practice of judicial review tends to destroy this
practical advantage of federalism because courts conservatively
tend to disallow radical and imaginative solutions to social ills,
and because a single, ultimate federal Court necessarily
expresses a uniform social philosophy, and inevitably prefers
consistency in its own decisions to provincial variety. Under the
guise of constitutionalism, the Courts will create and impose
uniform rules and procedures on the country as a whole, and
prevent the Provinces from fulfilling their legislative responsi-
bilities in an original fashion. There are numerous American
cases where legitimate legislative proposals were scuttled by the
Courts in the exercise of the judicial review power. In Tyson
and Bro. v. Banton5 9 the Supreme Court declared unconstitu-
tional a New York law restricting the scalping of theatre tickets
as an unreasonable interference with business. Mr. Justice
Holmes said in dissent:
The truth seems to me to be that, subject to
compensation when compensation is due, the legisla-
ture may forbid or restrict any business when it has a
sufficient force of public opinion behind it .... I am
far from saying that I think this particular law a wise
and rational provision. That is not my affair. But if
the people of the State of New York speaking by
their authorized voice say that they want it, I see
nothing in the Constitution of the United States to
prevent their having their will.
59. 273 U.S. 418, at pp. 446-7 (1927).
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Mr. Justice Harlan specifically referred to the social laboratory
concept in Rotb v. U.S.:
6 0
It has often been said that one of the great strengths
of our federal system is that we have, in the
forty-eight States, forty-eight experimental social
laboratories. "State statutory law reflects pre-
dominantly this capacity of a legislature to introduce
novel techniques of social control. The federal system
has the immense advantage of providing forty-eight
separate centers for such experimentation [Hart,
"The Relations Between State and Federal Law," 54
Col. L. Rev. 489, 493] ." Different States will have
different attitudes toward the same work of litera-
ture. The same book which is freely read in one State
might be classed as obscene in another. And it seems
to me that no overwhelming danger to our freedom
to experiment and to gratify our tastes in literature is
likely to result from the suppression of a borderline
book in one of the States, so long as there is no
uniform nation-wide suppression of the book and so
long as other States are free to experiment with the
same or bolder books.
One cannot help but wonder how such provincial
legislative schemes as compulsory automobile insurance, univer-
sal hospitalization, and medicare would have fared under
judicial review. If the American experience is any guide, these
schemes would have been immediately challenged by the courts,
and their development impeded.
Together with a tendency towards uniformity under
judicial review runs a tendency towards centralization of
authority and power. Federal power should be increased only if
people are in agreement that national uniformity is desirable.
Conversely, if centralization works against an effective federa-
lism, then an extension of judicial review should be rejected.
The American experience clearly indicates that provincial
legislation will be much less sympathetically treated by the
Courts than federal legislation, even where the legislation
primarily is of local concern. The attack will be made primarily
60. 354 U.S. 476, at pp. 505-6 (1957).
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against its constitutionality, not against its wisdom, and
provincial legislative capacity will be curbed. This tendency is
promoted by the federal orientation of Supreme Court Judges.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has noticed the centralization tendency
under American practice:
The veto power of the Supreme Court over the
social-economic legislation of the states, when ex-
ercised by a narrow conception of the due process
and equal protection of the law clauses, presents
undue centralization in its most destructive and least
responsible form. The most destructive, because it
stops experiment at its source, preventing an increase
of social knowledge by the only scientific method
available; namely the tests of trial and error. The least
responsible, because it so often turns on the
fortuitous circumstances which determine a majority
decision, and shelters the fallible judgment of
individual Justices, in matters of fact and opinion not
peculiarly within the special competence of judges,
behind the impersonal authority of the Constitu-
tion.
6
Accordingly, the Provinces will be restricted much more by
judicial review than will the federal government.
8. Judicial Review and the Bicultural Nature of Canada
The reality of Canadian biculturalism militates against a
harmonious operation of judicial review. Judicial review often
requires the Courts to ascertain a national consensus on key
issues, and to impose common standards against regional
dissent. It is doubtful, however, whether a Canadian consensus
actually exists in many important areas, and large segments of
the population would resent the culture of others being
imposed on them. Obvious examples are the areas of education,
language, and family relations, where substantial differences of
opinion exist across Canada.
The existence of two legal systems in Canada accentuates
the possibility of conflict. Some fundamental concepts are
61. Law and Politics, 1939, Harcourt, Brace and Co., p. 119.
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approached differently by the two systems, and Supreme Court
Judges are often called upon to rule on matters arising within a
culture and under a legal system different than their own. On
occasion the Supreme Court Judges have split along civil
law-common law lines, 6 2 and many people have questioned the
propriety of a system which makes that possible. To now
extend the areas where social values may be imposed upon
different cultures would be to invite greater disunity than
already exists in the country.
6 3
9. Constitutional Development Depending Upon Arbitrary,
Casual Factors
The American experience suggests that if Canadians adopt the
extended practice of judicial review, future constitutional
development will be based almost exclusively on court
decisions. Unfortunately, the adjudicative process is subject not
only to the political and philosophical biases of the Judges, but
to the limitations of the adversary system as well. Courts are
ordinarily restricted to a consideration of the issues raised
before them, and are not able to deal with the broader issues
which may be more important but irrelevant to the case at
hand. As a result, constitutional law becomes dependent "on
the whims of private litigants (and) turns on rather arbitrary,
casual factors of time and circumstances. ' ' 6 4 Problems cannot
be dealt with adequately or comprehensively, because only
restricted issues are placed before a court during the process of
litigation. It may be suggested that this process is too
accidental, too confining, and too unrealistic to evolve the
fundamental law of a nation. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in
one of his judgments:
To attempt to shape policy so as to avoid dishar-
monies in our divorce laws was not a power entrusted
to us, nor is the judiciary competent to exercise it.
Courts are not equipped to pursue the paths for
62. See for example, Roncarelli v. Duplessis [1959] S.C.R. 121, 16
D.L.R. (2d) 689 (partial split); and Lamb v. Benoit [1959] S.C.R. 321, 17
D.L.R. (2d) 369 (complete split).
63. For a general discussion of the dilemma of judicial review in a
bicultural society, see McWhinney, op. cit. fn. 18, pp. 243-262.
64. McWbinney, op. cit. fn. 18, p. 181.
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discovering wise policy. A Court is confined within
the bounds of particular record, and it cannot even
shape the record. Only fragments of a social problem
are seen through the narrow windows of a litigation.
Had we innate or acquired understanding of a social
problem in its entirety, we would not have at our
disposal adequate means for constructive
solution.... We cannot draw on the available power
for social invention afforded by the Constitution for
dealing adequately with the problem, because the
power belongs to the Congress and not to the
Court.65
In the process of constitutional adjudication, conflicts
between private litigants result in the establishment of public
law for an entire nation. Often public law and private law
become confused. A decision concerning what might be the
private grievance of a single litigant, based on a unique factual
situation, can be translated into a national rule of law, binding
on persons, and applicable to situations, uncontemplated by the
original court. The common law attitude to precedent tends to
enshrine constitutional decisions, and makes future change
difficult.
10. Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Precedent
If Canada adopted the extended practice of judicial review, our
Courts would immediately have to reject the existing applica-
tion of stare dicisis or the binding nature of precedent. As
indicated earlier, judicial review necessarily involves policy
decisions. Situations inevitably will arise where courts are
convinced that previous policy choices were wrong, or where
circumstances and conditions have so changed that different
policy approaches are required. In such situations, the courts
will be forced to reject previous decisions, and to substitute a
more flexible approach to precedent than the prevailing theory.
The leading Canadian authority on stare decisis is Stuart
v. Bank of Montreal,6 6 where the Supreme Court stated that it
would reverse itself only "in very exceptional circumstances".
65. Sberrer v. Sberrer 334 U.S. 343 at pp. 364-6 (1948, Dissenting).
66. [1909] 41 S.C.R. 516.
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What those circumstances might be is unclear, for there are no
reported decisions where the Supreme Court has specifically
reversed itself. The attitude of the Privy Council has been
similar - although not bound by its previous decisions, the
Court has stated:
But on constitutional questions it must be seldom
indeed that the Board would depart from a previous
decision which it may be assumed will have been
acted on both by governments and subjects. 6 7
It is noteworthy that the American view of stare decisis in
constitutional adjudication 6 8 has been exactly the opposite of
that expressed by the Privy Council, and it is submitted that our
courts will be forced to adopt the American position if they
exercise similar functions. This will run counter to our
democratic notion that changes in settled rules should be
effected through the will of the majority expressed in
Parliament.
11. Ineffectiveness of Judicial Protection
The basic rationalization of judicial review is that it will enable
the courts to protect the people against oppressive government
action. In the final analysis, however, the courts cannot save the
people if a majority of people do not want freedom. Freedom
can only be maintained by the dedication of the majority of
citizens to that goal, and once that dedication is gone, judicial
review is meaningless. Judge Learned Hand has stated this
proposition in elegant fashion:
[T] his much I think I do know - that a society so
riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no Court
can save; that a society where that spirit flourishes no
Court need save; that in a society which evades its
responsibility by thrusting upon the Courts the
67. A.G. for Ont. v. Canada Temperance Federation [19461 A.C. 193,
at p. 206.
68. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. 285 U.S. 393, at pp. 405-8
(1932); St. Joseph Stockyard Co. v. U.S. 298 U.S. 38, at
p. 94 (1936).
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nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will
perish.6 9
One appropriately can compare the English and Canadian
experience in fundamental rights with the American experience.
It is obvious that, at the very least, freedom is as highly prized
in England and Canada, without judicial review, as it is in the
United States, with it, Also, one legitimately can point out that
some of the finest constitutional bills of rights are found in
some of the most oppressive countries. The conclusion is
inescapable that the enjoyment of civil liberties is consequent
not upon the existence of an entrenched Bill of Rights, but
upon more fundamental conditions and attitudes. Indeed, there
is good reason to fear that an entrenched Bill may be
destructive of the vigilance required for the maintenance of a
free society.
12. Judicial Review Raising False Hopes
One of the great dangers of entrenching fundamental rights is
that entrenchment will lull the Canadian people into the false
belief that their rights will be effectively protected in the
future. Most people do not realize that abstract declarations of
rights are not effective for people who require help unless
publicly supported institutions and procedures are established
to promote and to enforce those rights. The Province of
Saskatchewan has had a Bill of Rights since 1947,"0 and it was
rarely been invoked. The Canadian Bill of Rights has been in
force for twelve years, and it has not had significant effect in
promoting human rights. Granted, the Bill was poorly drafted,
but it is evident that most of the cases in which the Bill was
invoked would have been decided the same way with an
entrenched Bill of Rights. It is also unfortunate that few
violations of human rights come under judicial scrutiny, because
it is usually the poor, the weak, and the submissive who are
discriminated against. Such persons rarely invoke court pro-
cedures to enforce their rights.
If one wishes to promote human rights in Canada, there
are better approaches which can be taken. We can establish
69. The Spirit of Liberty, Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand,
collected by Irving Dilliard, Knopf Inc., 1952, p. 181.
70. Presently found in R.S.S. 1965, c. 345.
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federal and provincial human rights commissions to reduce
discrimination between various citizens. We can establish federal
and provincial Ombudsmen to settle disputes between citizens
and government. We can establish permanent, well-organized
law reform commissions to constantly scrutinize our laws to
ensure that they are consonant with our ideals of freedom and
justice. The difficulty with entrenchment is that the public will
be misled into believing that entrenchment will significantly
provide redress for oppressed people, and thus it can be used as
an excuse for failure to take meaningful action.
13. The Search for a Canadian Identity
The adoption of constitutional entrenchment of fundamental
rights will create an irresistible tendency to adopt American
policies and solutions in civil liberties issues. Lawyers arguing
civil rights cases inevitably will tend to cite American decisions
in support of their contentions, and Judges will refer to those
decisions in arriving at their conclusions. This tendency has
already become apparent in cases dealing with the Canadian Bill
of Rights. The volume of American cases alone, dealing with an
endless variety of possible problems, will militate against an
original Canadian approach to Canadian problems. With the
constant bombardment of American ideas through the mass
media, and with powerful American economic pressures, it is
difficult enough at the present time to develop a distinctive
Canadian identity without compounding the difficulty by
adopting American legal and political practices.
14. A Comparision of Results
Some of the contentious above have been based in part on the
value judgment that Canadian society is a better society than
American society, that it is freer, more humanitarian, and more
just. It is submitted that this judgment is accurate, and that we
have achieved much more without judicial review than
American society has achieved with it. There are numerous
American practices that most Canadians would regard as
unfortunate. Examples are the treatment of minority groups;
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police practices; 7- ' pervading military influences; the persecu-
tion of Viet Nam War dissenters, including the prosecution of
such symbolic offences as draft card burning72 and flag
burning;7 3 the loyalty oaths programme;7" denial of passports
for political reasons;7  and school prayer, religious instruction,
and separate school decisions.7 6 Many Canadians are also
disturbed by the widespread lack of respect for the rights of
others, by the absence of law and order, and by the inability of
the government to control rampant crime.
Accordingly, if Canadians entrench fundamental rights
they will be rejecting a system which has worked reasonably
well in Canada in favour of a system that is working badly in
the United States. Surely this should not be done until it is
established clearly that such a change would be for the better. It
is doubtful whether such a case can be made.
71. A notorious example was the conduct of Chicago Police outside
the Democratic National Convention in 1968.
72. U.S. v. O'Brien 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968).
73. Street v. New York 394 U.S. 576, 22 L. Ed. 2d. 572, 89 S. Ct.
1354 (1969); Annotation, 22 L. Ed. 2d. 972.
74. See Communist Party of America v. Subversive Activities Control
Board 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Whitehill v. Elkins 88 S. Ct. 184 (1967); Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond 401 U.S. 154, 27 L.
Ed. 2d 749, 91 S. Ct. 720 (1971); Cole v. Richardson 92 S. Ct. 1332
(1972).
75. See Zemel v. Rusk 381 U.S. 1 (1965), reh. den. 382 U.S. 873
(1966).
76. See McCollum v. Board of Education 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Engel
v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Schood Dist. of Abington Township v.
Scbempp 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Horace Mann League of U.S. of America
Inc. v. Bd. of Public Works 242 Md. 645, 220 A. 2d 51, app. dismissed in
part, cert. den. in part 385 U.S. 97 (1966); Board of Education of Central
School District v. Allen 392 U.S. 236, 20 L. Ed. 2d. 1060, 88 S. Ct. 1923
(1968); Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602, 29 L. Ed. 2d. 745, 91 S. Ct.
2105 (1971), reh. den. 404 U.S. 876, 30 L. Ed. 2d. 123, 92 S. Ct. 24.
